Touch and the cheirotic apprehension of prehistoric figurines

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Introduction

Standard studies of prehistoric anthropomorphic figurines have launched their analyses from an exclusively visual perspective that focuses on patterns and materials of surface decoration. I propose that a richer, more nuanced understanding of these artefacts results from a cheirotic approach, recognising that engaging an object through touch affords a particular, proximal, way of knowing that is much deeper than traditional analyses and interpretations which restrict insight to representational knowledge. A cheirotic approach examines the conditions and consequences of an object being enveloped by the hand, and thus brings the actions and consequences of touch into play. Touch as an act and a sense is intersubjective and transcendental; it engages the philosophy and psychology of the hand, humanism, and the privilege of the tactile. With a cheirotic engagement, the analysis of prehistoric figurines is released from the preconceived, simplified, categories of fixed description and explanation that accompany visual-only investigation; the result is that fluid and uncertain compositions of understanding drift to the surface in a more honest, though more challenging, truth of figurines.

Prehistoric figurines

The inventory of anthropomorphic figurines from prehistoric Europe is vast with many thousands of examples, with especially numerous and varied ones recovered from sites of the Neolithic period in central and southeastern Europe (6500–3500 BC).1 The Neolithic marks an important change in the ways that people lived their lives in prehistoric Europe. From a mode of subsistence that relied (and succeeded for tens of thousands of years)
on the knowledgeable gathering and hunting and fishing of available, wild resources, there gradually emerged a dependence on the cultivation of high energy plants (such as wheat and barley) and on the breeding of animals (such as sheep, goat, pig and cattle). Accompanying this transition was the emergence of a built environment (that is, of houses and villages), as well as the adaptation of a ceramic pyrotechnology to make vessels (eventually in very large numbers) and many other objects of daily use. Figurines were one example of these new objects.

Small, and made of fired clay (animal bone was also used, though much less commonly), Neolithic figurines have been recovered from domestic contexts almost exclusively (the exception is the Hamangia culture where figurines are found in burials). With the exception of the Hamangia examples (which are unique), there is no unambiguous evidence that figurines were associated with any single context, such as putative shrines or near hearths and ovens. During excavation, most figurines are found in broken condition in rubbish pits or as fragments scattered across a site. Interpretation is commonly crafted from reconstructions of mother goddess or fertility cults and ceremonies as popularised by the late Marija Gimbutas and widely, though uncritically, adapted by many regional specialists. More recent studies have questioned the assumptions of the goddess interpretation, and have pushed research in new directions noting both the discovery of male figurines from this period as well as figures with no clearly identifiable sexual identities (that is, many are best defined as depictions of asexual, or sexually ambiguous human beings).

In a recent study, I argued that the best way to think about Neolithic figurines is to look beyond particular interpretations of figurine function or meaning. My proposal was to transcend suggestions made by previous scholars that figurines were goddesses or votives, or that they were toys for children, or that they were portraits of ancestors, or that they were teaching tools. I argued that these suggestions of function are nothing more than anecdotal explanations: all are based weakly on historical or ethnographic comparison; none can be (dis)proved – that is to say, we will never know what these figurines were used for or what was the precise meaning that an individual in the Neolithic held for them. It is more honest to recognise that any individual Neolithic figurine would have had several different functions and meanings each of which would have changed during the artefact’s lifetime (from creation, through use, to final discard) and each of which would have varied depending on the age, gender, experience, intention, background, needs, desires and worries and so on of the individual who made, held, used, saw, handled, broke and threw away the figurine. Critically, each of the various perceptions, uses and meanings that any single figurine might have attracted would have been equally valid and, vitally, also equally unavailable for conclusive assessment by a modern archaeologist.
My proposal was that we concentrate not on any particular (unassessible) function or meaning of any one particular figurine from a specific excavation context from a well-documented category of ‘Neolithic figurines’ that wanders across regions and cultural phases). Instead, I suggested that we spend our energies considering the specific physical conditions that figurines possessed and the effects that these conditions might have had on people who daily looked at and handled these objects 8,000 years ago. I concluded that three conditions are primary: figurines are miniatures; figurines are anthropomorphic; figurines are three-dimensional. Taken together, these three conditions combine to make Neolithic figurines distinct from all other material culture from the period. The condition of three-dimensionality is the stimulus for the present chapter (which in turn stimulates us to consider the significance and consequence of cheirotic apprehension), and as such will be discussed in detail further below. In advance of that discussion I need to offer a brief comment about the other two essential conditions of figurines: miniaturism and anthropomorphism.

**Miniaturism and anthropomorphism**

Making a small-scale version of an object or person, and then experiencing that miniature (playing with, thinking about, imagining, manipulating, holding, hiding, displaying, breaking, discarding) has unusual effects on the person experiencing the object made small. At a physical level, a person handling a miniature gains subtle empowerment and strengthening: in relation to what is represented in small-scale, one is made to feel larger in size and advanced in hierarchical position; a soothing sense of wellbeing follows. Toy manufacturers know this, as do the manufacturers and hobbyists committed to the intensely intricate model boat, car and train. It was Walt Disney, however, who exploited most publicly the potential for putting people in a scaled-down environment. Disney built Main Street in Disneyland at $5/8$ths scale specifically to put people at ease, to calm them, to soothe them (this was one of his goals in creating Disneyland – to give people a place to escape from the harsh and unpleasant realities of the real world). Disney’s soothing of the visitors provided them with another world to visit, a world where escape and calm were powerfully implicit.

More striking than Disney’s use of size-reduction on Main Street were the patterns that the University of Tennessee psychologist Alton Delong recognised among the subjects of experiments he conducted in his studies of the effects that small-scale environments have on human perception. In the first of two famous studies, Delong showed that subjects who had been playing the computer game Pong on small screen televisions won more often and were happier about their gaming experience than were subjects who had played the game on larger screens; EEG records confirmed that the
brain activities of small screen Pong players differed significantly from those of large screen players. In a second experiment, Delong demonstrated that the smaller the scale that people imagined that they were in, the faster their brains appeared to work. Delong asked subjects to predict the passage of time while they imagined themselves to be in miniature rooms that had been built at 1/6th, 1/12th and 1/24th scales; subject predictions of time passage were inaccurate, all were underestimates, and a clear pattern emerged in which length of each time estimate was directly related to the size of the scale reduction (the smaller the scale the shorter the time estimate). Delong concluded that when people put themselves into small-scale environments, their brain clocks slow down. For Delong’s subjects, working at the small scale took them into another temporal dimension.

In these and other experiments, in small-scale arboriculture, and in work by artists intrigued by the effects that small-scale worlds have on spectators (for example, see Michael Ashkin’s table-top landscapes, any bonsai tree or Anthony Gormley’s *Field* series), variations of the same remarkable conclusions emerge: when people imagine themselves to be in miniature environments, they enter other worlds in which they are enlarged, soothed and able to carry out some mental tasks more efficiently and according to an altered time scale.¹⁰

When the object made miniature is the human body, then the consequences of miniaturism have significance at another level. Academic work on the use of dolls in therapy and psychology, police work and other areas have investigated the ways that bodies-made-small have powerful effects on people.¹¹ One of the most widely discussed cases is the impact that the Barbie Doll has on young girls’ perceptions of their vocational potential and of their body shape.¹² Debate over the impact of Barbie on girls settles between two opposing camps: those who see her as a glorious model for young girls to gain inspiration for the limitless opportunities for professional and social development (you can do any job and achieve any position); and those who see her as a dangerous, subconscious, brainwasher of young girls and their perceptions of desirable body shape.¹³ The importance of Barbie and of these debates for my suggestions about miniature bodies is not an attempt to take sides or resolve the disagreements (probably neither camp is completely correct). What is significant is that a miniature woman-shaped object (purchased and used for one reason – as a toy for a child to play with) has the potential for such strong, subconscious, effects on girls (and, strangely, on adults who wage the culture wars over those effects).

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**Figurines, small bodies and the Neolithic**

Seen in the light of the power of miniaturism to take people into other worlds and the ways that bodies made small can affect people’s perceptions of what is the
correct appearance of a body (male or female), a more nuanced understanding emerges of the position that figurines may have held in the Neolithic period of central and southeastern Europe. As noted above, the Neolithic was a period of remarkable change in technology, economy and almost every other way in which people lived their lives. Accompanying the more obvious and visible changes in how people lived (for instance, how they gained their food) was a fundamental transformation in the ways that people related to one another, on individual, person-to-person, terms, as well as group-to-group. Some of this social transformation came as (probably) unintended consequences of the adaptation of the new economies and activities. For example, the collaboration and sharing (or hoarding) of trust, labour and resources that accompanied small-scale farming would have shaped social and political relationships among these small communities. Similar, also unintended effects would have resulted from the introduction of new arrangements of people in the landscape that followed the introduction of houses (and thus of households) and of the collections of particular sets of houses (and thus of village communities). In brief it was a period through which personal and group identities were finding new forms, new media and new potentials.

The powerful position that the human body occupies as the locus for social identity and which has dominated European proto-history and history emerged for the first time during the Neolithic. The Neolithic emergence of the body as the primary container or canvas for personal human identity gradually replaced other, earlier ways of living and of thinking about human relationships. These ways had worked in distributing identity through less rigidly defined communities – such as hunter-gatherer-fishers – in more fluid and flexible series of calculations and negotiations. One of the clearest records of the elevation of the body to its position of pre-eminence can be seen in the (often) elaborate ways in which these communities treated the deceased. By the end of the Neolithic in southeastern Europe, for example, grand cemeteries of many hundreds of individual inhumations reveal clear patterns of unequal depositions of prestige and exotic grave goods: of Europe’s earliest metals – gold and copper – and molluscs (for example shells such as *spondylus* which had local significance for projecting personal identity and, perhaps, social and political status).

While this attention to the body at time of death in the Neolithic is a well appreciated example of the emergence of the body of an individual as the key unit of identity within human society, less attention has been devoted to the powerful role that anthropomorphic figurines would have played in the same process. I have argued elsewhere that, perhaps surprisingly, it is the many thousands of figurines that made the greatest input into the elevation of the human body as the locus of personhood. In brief, the presence of small human bodies – that is, figurines – variously shaped and decorated, made, used, seen and lived with, in houses and villages across the region, powered
a deep and subconscious process through which the human form came to be the base currency for identity in European prehistory (and history).

The third dimension, touch and cheirotics

The understanding of Neolithic figurines that I had developed in terms of miniaturism and anthropomorphism and my arguments about the resulting elevation of the human body as the locus for identity were fine as far as they went. Regardless of the merits of those arguments, however, I realise now that my work has remained within the limitations of a visual approach, and to be honest, though I still believe in the core of the argument, I have become less convinced that I had provided any real insight into the mechanics of how the emergence and dominance of the body within European senses of identity and community had happened in the daily, lived experiences of Neolithic people. In brief, I had ignored and avoided thinking through the everyday physical practice and process of how figurines had the effects that I was suggesting that they had. I had failed to examine the third of my critical conditions of the figurines; I had neglected considering the significance and powerful consequences of knowing through touch.

Touch

When bodies made miniature are made in three dimensions, our understanding is enriched greatly if we think through the sense of touch and if we take a cheirotic approach. Coupled with their small size, figurines’ physical condition of three-dimensionality generates particular interactions with people: figurines afford touching and being held in the hand. Touch is a much discussed topic in the humanities and the social sciences with a broad and deep pedigree (which makes it even more striking that, beyond a very few recent attempts, especially by Lynn Meskell and Carolyn Nakamura on figurines from Çatalhöyük), the topic has not been engaged intensively by archaeologists. For Aristotle, touch, touching and being touched were essential aspects for human existence (On the Soul, 2.II.423a–b). For Emmanuel Levinas, touch is important in its distinction from other senses: the action of one touching another propels contact beyond mere physical connection through a rich and complex engagement (which is immediate and unmediated) to a place where there are no interventions by other substances, where an ‘intimate proximity’ is invoked, where to submit to the action of touching or caressing is to admit that as one does not know precisely what one seeks, one must admit to the absence of predetermined knowing.

For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, touch brings into play an immediacy of relationship that exceeds other attempts at interpretation or explanation where
experience and knowing are reduced to simplification and generalisation. In referring to this immediacy, Merleau-Ponty pushes us to reject the assumption that an object (or a body) ends at its surface (or its skin). Through touch the limit between the body and the world breaks down; the result is an intertwining, an intersection and a cross-over towards the subconscious and the metaphysical aura of touch. Touch is intersubjective. Making a related point, Jacques Derrida writes that touch has a transcendental status. Levinas’, Merleau-Ponty’s and Derrida’s thoughts unbalance and unnerve me. How am I distinct from other people? Where does my being end? What is its surface and what separates that surface from the surfaces of others? If an object (or my body) does not end with its surface (or my skin), then am I distinct from other people? Indeed, does the entity ‘person’ have any intellectual or physical surety? By questioning the security and stability of the limits that we have assumed exist and which separate objects from people and people from people and objects from objects, we open up our understanding of our worlds in ways that are both exciting and disturbing.

The action and sense of touch, thus, can be taken to be concerned with surfaces, limits and boundaries. James Gibson tells us that the surface is where the action is, though only in the recognition, perhaps, that surfaces dissolve under the condition of touch. Kevin Hetherington has argued persuasively that touch decentralises the subject. His work with Sarah, a blind museum visitor, reveals Sarah’s tacit understanding that touch is a way of knowing that is distinct from vision (and the other senses). Touch is a way of knowing that decentralises Sarah from the assumed position that she is a singular, representing subject. Hetherington and David Appelbaum ask us to think about the ways that touch is productive and performative. Appelbaum argues that while the accumulation of visual knowledge is a process of consumption, the exploration by the hand is a process of making and production: touch ‘concerns itself with knowledge as both performance and material accomplishment and only latterly with representation’ if, indeed, it considers representation at all.

Following Robert Copper and John Law, and Gabriel Josipovici, Hetherington makes the important point that the knowledge that is acquired via touch is proximal (and is distinct from distal knowledge). Distal knowledge provides broad and detached understandings based on knowledge at a distance or with a concern for the big picture. Distal knowing works through representation, and focuses on an object (or person) being known in a static and completed state; it relies on preconceptions and on what is already known by illustrating boundaries and separation, distinctness and clarity, hierarchy and order. Proximal knowledge is a very different animal. Proximal knowledge is context-specific, fragmentary, mundane and performative; it allows for fluidity, uncertainty, incompleteness and is always partial and precarious. Proximal knowledge opens up interpretation, denying the finality that Western (social) science demands.
Standard interpretations of prehistoric figurines (and indeed explanation within archaeology more broadly witnessed) strive to produce distal knowledge, seeking clear understandings in simple terms: this figurine is a votive, that one is a toy, the other is a portrait of an ancestor. If we think about touch in the terms suggested by Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Appelbaum and Heatherington, and if we accept the challenge of seeking proximal understandings, then the modern intellectual (and prehistoric Neolithic) engagement with figurines is an opportunity to transcend the simplicity of trying to interpret a miniature, anthropomorphic object made 8,000 years ago. To accept this challenge requires us to ask new questions about these figurines. What happens when people (past and present) take these small objects in their hands? One way to attempt an answer is to examine the process and consequences of holding and grasping an object (and a small-bodied one at that).

CHEIROTICS AND THE HAND

Within an investigation of touch a cheirotic approach focuses our enquiry onto the hand: cheirotics refers to the ability of an object to be enveloped in the hand, or to the process of enveloping something in the hand; cheir comes from the Greek for hand or handling (for instance, a cheiropod is an animal with hands). Figurines are cheirotic objects; in their size and three dimensionality they afford being held in the hand (Figs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). In the cheirotic sense then, when we think about figurines we would do well to think about the hand and about the particular engagement with the world that the hand allows.

For Derrida, it is the hand which makes us human as it allows for attaining, taking, comprehending, analysing and knowing. For the eighteenth-century French philosopher Françoise Maine de Biran, the hand was that thing which is properly human; Biran writes of a hu-manualism and the important role for human conscious experience that physical connections to the external world play. Edmund Husserl writes about the hand and the privilege of the tactile that the hand provides for humans. A psychology of the hand informs on the ways that we assess objects physically in the world. The cognitive psychologists Susan Lederman and Roberta Klatzky write about haptic apprehension and study the ways in which humans manually assess and understand the properties of objects. Lederman and her colleagues suggest that in the haptic apprehension of an object, a person assesses the different properties of the object and how those properties combine to produce the whole. They contrast this process of apprehension with that of recognition or categorisation. Through touch we come to know objects in particular ways. When the hand encloses an object, it makes contact with as much of the object’s surface as possible. Enclosure and envelopment are non-specialised actions which allow the taking of just enough general information about the object. They invite further investigation of a more
specialised nature directed at specific parts or areas of an object, investigations which may require the use of fingers to make more precise assessments and to deepen particular apprehensions.

Have humans always had the physical abilities to engage objects in the hand as we do today? What do we know about the evolution of the hand as an anatomical and, indeed, as an intellectual capacity? There is nothing novel
in recognising the consequences (or could it have been a cause?) of the shift to bipedal locomotion for our ancient hominin ancestors sometime around 3.85 million years ago (or mya); hands were emancipated and could do other things, such as making and using objects like stone tools. The consequence of this development (though it could just as easily have been the cause of the shift) may well have been most important in non-functional ways, for example the importance of gesture in a symbolic sense for communication and expression. Over the longer time-scale of hominin evolution, developments in the capabilities that the human hand had for grasping and apprehending an object may well have been significant not only in functional terms (making and using tools) but also with respect to behaviour, the development of human consciousness and the human sense of what we are in relation to the world around us.
Work by John Napier has suggested that there were two important developments in the ways that hominins used their hands to grip things (but see also the work of Mary Marzke and colleagues). Napier writes of the evolution of the power grip, as used to hold a tool in the hand or wield it with striking force, as one would do with a hammer. This is an ability to be found in Homo habilis (the first toolmaker) and Homo erectus (the first hominin to move out of Africa) (from 2.4 mya and 1.9 mya respectively). Thus, Napier writes about the grip of Homo neanderthalensis (from as early as 200,000 years ago) as being primarily adapted for greater gripping strength and with a facility for power gripping (that is, holding objects in the palm of the hand with the thumb acting as a brace). In contrast is the precision grip which can be found with the emergence of Homo sapiens sapiens (anatomically modern humans – that’s us) from between 200,000 and 150,000 years ago.

With the emergence of anatomically modern humans, more precise handling (and apprehension of objects) was possible through finer finger movements and oblique grips. The precision grip allowed modern humans to move an object around in their fingers. It allows you to turn the pages of this book or click the mouse to access the pdf version of this chapter. Where earlier hominins were gripping objects, modern humans (like us) were handling and manipulating them. The distinction is important, particularly in the context of the comments included above about the ways in which the handling of an object allows a person to apprehend a proximal knowledge of that object. The distinction between the handling, manipulating and manually manoeuvring of objects by modern humans on the one hand, and the earlier power gripping by Homo habilis and Homo erectus is a fundamental one. Though perhaps founded on (or at least enabled by) skeletal and musculature development, the distinction may have had most importance in terms of human cognitive abilities. If this is the case, then the consequences of the ability that modern humans have for precision handling and thus for a more nuanced, richer and deeper, haptic apprehension of objects (and of people and animals and of every other part of the world), may be more significant in terms of our intellectual abilities to think and to understand the world(s) around us than it is in terms of any new tool-based technologies or uses.

There is no question that this essential development in manual abilities accompanied technological and expressive developments both in material culture (for example the types of tools that were produced – composite tools with many parts) and in the ways in which tools could be used (for instance,
the use of finely pointed flint objects such as burins and awls to engrave marks onto ivory and wood and to make holes in hides and softer materials). More critical, however, is the recognition that it was at this time of our evolutionary past – that is, with the appearance of anatomically modern humans – that our ancestors made the first art: representational and abstract, and including the cave paintings of western Europe and the earliest (Upper Palaeolithic) human figurines in western, central and northeastern Europe. When trying to unlock the secrets of the emergence of modern humans and their particular suite of abilities, perhaps we should focus our attention as much on the capabilities and actions of our ancestors’ hands as we do on their economies – scavenging, foraging, hunting – or on their communication hardware – development of the voice box and the ability to speak a language. In addition, while so much attention has been spent dating and analysing the first art of the modern humans (the cave paintings and indeed the Upper Palaeolithic figurines), it is perhaps of at least equal importance to note that some of the most mysterious imagery on the walls of caves are the many hundreds of hand silhouettes.

Back to the Neolithic and a cheirotics of figurines

My original proposal for a rich way to think about Neolithic figurines was to locate their emergence in the prehistoric period of Europe within the
sedimentation of personal, political and social identity onto the human body. Having worked through the consequences of the hand, of holding and of the development of manipulative handling, that proposal is strengthened: a figurine’s condition of three-dimensionality empowered it as an object to bring the human body into human apprehension through touch (as well, of course, as through vision). However, by thinking in terms of their cheirotic character, we can now see more clearly the strength that the Neolithic figurine had in promoting in human thinking (probably at a subconscious level) the role that the physical frame of the individual human body should play as a resting place for the human spirit.

The role that I envisage the figurines to have occupied is one in which they may well have functioned as a toy or a goddess votive. However, the critical step away from these conclusions as reductions of meaning and interpretation is to understand that touching and holding a body-made-small would have had extraordinarily powerful impacts on the ways that people in the Neolithic conceptualised their worlds. The consequences were complex and highly nuanced, and would have raised deeper, initially unanswerable questions about who and what one was and about what was an appropriate relationship of one to another. These are questions of a metaphysical nature that challenge the boundaries of being, along which and beyond which people have commonly and unquestioningly lived their lives. In the sense of a proximal knowledge of self and of one’s relationships to others, these figurines presented to the Neolithic people (who made, touched, handled, broke and tossed them onto a rubbish tip) an open and unending set of negotiations about the role that the human body was to have within society. We have been living with the consequences of their reactions ever since.

Notes
1. The first figurines appeared in small numbers in the Upper Palaeolithic (for example, the recent discovery of a figurine from Hohle Fels in Germany dating to 35,000 years ago; N.J. Conrad, ‘A Female Figurine from the Basal Augrignacian of Hohle Fels Cave in Southwestern Germany’, Nature, 459, 2009, pp.248–52) of western, central and Russian Europe, and though the consequences of a cheirotic approach applies equally to them as to Neolithic figurines, I restrict my discussion here to the material with which I am most familiar.
2. The widely held belief that Neolithic figurines were used and deposited in Neolithic shrines is based on false and circular reasoning: the presence of figurines is first used to define a building as a shrine; and then the figurines are given a religious or ceremonial function because they are found in a shrine.
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7. Of related interest are other miniature objects such as small-scale house and furniture models and animal figurines, though both of these types of artefacts appear much less frequently than do anthropomorphic figurines.


27. Heatherington, ‘Spatial Textures’, p.239.

28. There are of course Neolithic figurines which cannot be completely held in the hand, figurines which are larger. However, the vast majority of figurines from the Neolithic of central and southeastern Europe afford being held in the hand.


33. In a recent article, I have made the case that prehistoric European figurines were one of the key mechanisms in the development of modern, Western conceptions of gender and of the sedimentation of gendered identity in the body; Bailey, ‘Figurines, Corporeality, and the Origins of Gender’.

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Sculpture and Touch

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